Search results for "Repeated game"
showing 10 items of 24 documents
Density Flow in Dynamical Networks via Mean-Field Games
2016
Current distributed routing control algorithms for dynamic networks model networks using the time evolution of density at network edges, while the routing control algorithm ensures edge density to converge to a Wardrop equilibrium, which was characterized by an equal traffic density on all used paths. We rearrange the density model to recast the problem within the framework of mean-field games. In doing that, we illustrate an extended state-space solution approach and we study the stochastic case where the density evolution is driven by a Brownian motion. Further, we investigate the case where the density evolution is perturbed by a bounded adversarial disturbance. For both the stochastic a…
Adaptation, coordination, and local interactions via distributed approachability
2017
This paper investigates the relation between cooperation, competition, and local interactions in large distributed multi-agent\ud systems. The main contribution is the game-theoretic problem formulation and solution approach based on the new framework\ud of distributed approachability, and the study of the convergence properties of the resulting game model. Approachability\ud theory is the theory of two-player repeated games with vector payoffs, and distributed approachability is here presented for\ud the first time as an extension to the case where we have a team of agents cooperating against a team of adversaries under local\ud information and interaction structure. The game model turns i…
Strategic Thinking under social influence: Scalability, stability and robustness of allocations
2016
This paper studies the strategic behavior of a large number of game designers and studies the scalability, stability and robustness of their allocations in a large number of homogeneous coalitional games with transferable utilities (TU). For each TU game, the characteristic function is a continuous-time stochastic process. In each game, a game designer allocates revenues based on the extra reward that a coalition has received up to the current time and the extra reward that the same coalition has received in the other games. The approach is based on the theory of mean-field games with heterogeneous groups in a multi-population regime.
Robust Allocation Rules in Dynamical Cooperative TU Games
2011
Robust dynamic coalitional TU games are repeated TU games where the values of the coalitions are unknown but bounded variables. We set up the game supposing that the Game Designer uses a vague measure of the extra reward that each coalition has received up to the current time to re-adjust the allocations among the players. As main result, we provide a constructive method for designing allocation rules that converge to the core of the average game. Both the set up and the solution approach also provide an insight on commonalities between coalitional games and stability theory.
Codification schemes and finite automata
2000
This paper is a note on how Information Theory and Codification Theory are helpful in the computational design both of communication protocols and strategy sets in the framework of finitely repeated games played by boundedly rational agents. More precisely, we show the usefulness of both theories to improve the existing automata bounds of Neyman¿s (1998) work on finitely repeated games played by finite automata.
A saturated strategy robustly ensures stability of the cooperative equilibrium for Prisoner's dilemma
2016
We study diffusion of cooperation in a two-population game in continuous time. At each instant, the game involves two random individuals, one from each population. The game has the structure of a Prisoner's dilemma where each player can choose either to cooperate (c) or to defect (d), and is reframed within the field of approachability in two-player repeated game with vector payoffs. We turn the game into a dynamical system, which is positive, and propose a saturated strategy that ensures local asymptotic stability of the equilibrium (c, c) for any possible choice of the payoff matrix. We show that there exists a rectangle, in the space of payoffs, which is positively invariant for the syst…
Consensus in opinion dynamics as a repeated game
2018
Abstract We study an n -agent averaging process with dynamics subject to controls and adversarial disturbances. The model arises in multi-population opinion dynamics with macroscopic and microscopic intertwined dynamics. The averaging process describes the influence from neighbouring populations, whereas the input term indicates how the distribution of opinions in the population changes as a result of dynamical evolutions at a microscopic level (individuals’ changing opinions). The input term is obtained as the vector payoff of a two player repeated game. We study conditions under which the agents achieve robust consensus to some predefined target set. Such conditions build upon the approac…
On the Coincidence of the Feedback Nash and Stackelberg Equilibria in Economic Applications of Differential Games
2002
In this paper the scope of the applicability of the Stackelberg equilibrium concept in differential games is investigated. Firstly, conditions for obtaining the coincidence between the Stackelberg and Nash equilibria are defined in terms of the instantaneous pay-off function and the state equation of the game. Secondly, it is showed that for a class of differential games with state-interdependence both equilibria are identical independently of the player being the leader of the game. A survey of different economic models shows that this coincidence is going to occur for a good number of economic applications of differential games. This result appears because of the continuous-time setting i…
REPEATED GAMES WITH PROBABILISTIC HORIZON
2005
Repeated games with probabilistic horizon are defined as those games where players have a common probability structure over the length of the game's repetition, T. In particular, for each t, they assign a probability pt to the event that "the game ends in period t". In this framework we analyze Generalized Prisoners' Dilemma games in both finite stage and differentiable stage games. Our construction shows that it is possible to reach cooperative equilibria under some conditions on the distribution of the discrete random variable T even if the expected length of the game is finite. More precisely, we completely characterize the existence of sub-game perfect cooperative equilibria in finite s…
Advantage of Quantum Strategies in Random Symmetric XOR Games
2013
Non-local games are known as a simple but useful model which is widely used for displaying nonlocal properties of quantum mechanics. In this paper we concentrate on a simple subset of non-local games: multiplayer XOR games with 1-bit inputs and 1-bit outputs which are symmetric w.r.t. permutations of players.